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Utility and Beneﬁts of Water in Andalusi Law.
Criteria for its Proportional, Balanced
Allocation and Distribution (8th and 9th
Centuries)
Communicated by Ignaz Czeguhn
Interest in the analysis of the legislation governingwater use and distribution in al-Andalus
is evident among scholars due to two facts: the coexistence of different legal systems and
the implementation of a casuistic system of law. It deals with concepts such as responsibil-
ity and participation in water management and the conservation of water. This research
is an analysis focused on justifying the roots of the Andalusi irrigation system that were
grounded in Mudejar legal sources, which themselves were based on the Andalusi and
Arabic sources applied in al-Andalus during the 8–17th centuries and beyond. The ex-
planation of the irrigation system methodology concerns the migration from different
territories, which allowed the implementation of new hydraulic facilities and, as a result,
a new system of distribution and rational utilisation of water. Now is the right time to
explain the contents of the water law enforced in the Iberian Peninsula over the centuries,
thanks to the knowledge of case law from the Syrians, Egyptians, Tunisians of Qayrawan,
and kadis of Ceuta whom were considered technicians in terms of hisba; a matter directly
linked with water supply.
Utility; water regime (al-ah
˙
kām al mi’āh); irrigation shift; water scarcity; irrigators; common
responsibility; al-Andalus
El interés en el análisis de la legislación sobre la administración y distribución del agua
en al-Andalus es evidente entre los estudiosos del derecho, en virtud de dos hechos: la
coexistencia de diferentes sistemas legales y la aplicación de un sistema legal basado en
el casuismo. Con ello se gestionan conceptos como responsabilidad y participación en
la administración y conservación del agua. Esta investigación se centra en justiﬁcar las
raíces del sistema de irrigación aplicado por los musulmanes en la Península ibérica, a
partir de las fuentes andalusíes y árabes aplicadas por musulmanes y mudéjares, durante
los siglos VIII al XVII. La justiﬁcación legal del sistema y metodología de irrigación se
debió a la migración desde distintos territorios, e hizo posible la aplicación de nuevas
técnicas hidráulicas como resultado de un nuevo sistema de distribución y utilización
racional del agua. Es ahora el momento de explicar el contenido del derecho de agua
vigente durante siglos, gracias al conocimiento de los casos planteados por sirios, egipcios,
tunecinos de Qayrawan y ceutíes, quienes fueron considerados técnicos en términos de
hisba; la institución vinculada directamente con el suministro del agua.
Utilidad, régimen de las aguas (al-ah
˙
kām al mi’āh), turno, escasez de agua, regantes, respon-
sabilidad compartida, al-Andalus.
Thanks to the invitation of Prof. Ignacio Czeguhn, it has been possible to participate in the research project
B-1 Routes-Water-Knowledge, whose Spokeperson is Prof. Cosima Möller. I was invited as Senior Fellow and
have been developing my research since 2016, based in the headquarters of the Excellence Cluster Topoi,
Berlin.






kām al mi’ā) is an attractive topic for scholars of the Magreb and al-
Andalus, though it has barely been addressed from the perspective of the Islamic law
system (ﬁqh) in relation to Islamic transaction and commercial law, such as qisma, kira, and
hisba, institutions related to the management of water. This was clearly evidenced by the
disciple of Ibn abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, al-Barād
¯
i’ī (d. 1049), the author of one important




ir in the 15th century for the Moorish1; by the kadi
of Toledo, Ibn Sahl (d. 1096), the author of the Dīwān al-Ah
˙
kam al-Kubrā; by the jurist
fromMalaga al-Sˇa’bī (d. 1103) in his masterwork al-↩Ah
˙









ī (d. 1426), the
jurisconsult author of the Tuhfāt; and by Al-Wansˇarīsī (d. in Fez 1508),2 among others.
The rich development of the ﬁeld of water regimes in Islamic law was supported by
the interaction that occurred betweenMuslims, Christians, and Jews in themid-seventeen
century in territories governed by Byzantine law. The arrival of the new Muslim con-
querors focused attention on how to conquer the land, adjusting to the demands of the
soil and water in order to revitalize the barren lands. The same process occurred in al-
Andalus over a century later, on the other side of the Mediterranean basin.
One of the main issues arising within the framework of the Islamic system on water
regime matters is the type of legal relationships that were established with regard to this
‘good’. In general terms, Islamic law foresaw two types of relationship.
Firstly, wewill look at the relationship of the subjectmatter or thing (māl). The subject
matter, for jurists, is the reference object from which the different institutions related to
estate law can be classiﬁed.3 Thus, for example, water supply can be subject to salam,
that is, to a commutative contract, even though the object upon which that business rests
generates doubts about its legality due to restrictions on ‘water trade’. Indeed, this contract
is a sale with an anticipated payment of a price, which is ﬁxed by a ‘legal deadline’. There
are a number of conditions for this contract: the compensation cannot be in the same
currency used at the beginning of the transaction, neither in type nor in species. The type
– quantity and quality – of what has been received as compensation should be speciﬁed,
as well as data about the place where, and the date when, the business transaction will
be carried out. All these requirements result in avoiding the uncertainty or alea and,
ultimately, usury. However, the main problem concerning the object of this contract
modality is the extent to which the salam contract is licit when the water, according to
sˇarī’a, cannot be sold. In this sense, the doctrine only allows this business transaction to
take place when the object is the supply of water for a speciﬁc time period and for a
particular place. If the seller pledges to deliver a certain amount in terms of type, volume,
and quality, he will not be allowed to receive compensation in the same currency or
good. In the case of water, it is inferred that whoever makes the delivery does not ‘sell’
the water, but instead sells the right to receive the water; and he will not receive water
as compensation, but ‘bread and other things’ that are the products that result from
the use of water, as used to be done in al-Andalus pursuant to the custom prevailing
amongst Mudejars. The Mālikī scholars, following the doctrine of Mālik,4 saw water as a
‘common utility good’ which, in principle, could not be ‘in the hands’ of anyone on an
exclusive basis, hence, why negotiating about it was not allowed; this becomes visible in
1 Montero Muñoz 2009, 18.
2 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 8; Barges 1887, 420–422; Al-Sˇa↩bī 1992, 72–81; Ibn Sahl 1978, 1093–1095, 1096, 1098.
3 Castro 2007, 63.
4 From now on, the term used to refere to the madhab or followers of a scholar will be doctrine.
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the Andalusi legislation preserved until well into the 15th century, and applicable within
the Mudejar community.5
Secondly, there is the legal relationship concerning the utility brought about by the
‘good’, and which are framed within the context of the legal ‘right of use’. The utility of
water provides a beneﬁt that is in the interest of the community, guaranteed by means of
special distribution, allocation, and protection, so that one can actually speak about the
utility of the thing (manf ’a). In this case, it is impossible for someone to obtain beneﬁts
fromwater if they attempt to individualize water lawfully, as it is an object covered by very
speciﬁc rules that prevent this. This is the key for understanding the special treatment of
the ‘right of way’ in relation to water under Islamic law. Hence, the particular treatment
and consideration of the ‘water regime’ applied in Iberian territories is deserving of further
study via a case study, according to al-Awzā’i (d. 773) and Mālikī Andalusi law.
2 Denial of water ownership in Mālikī and al-Sˇāﬁ↪ī traditions.
The duty to share water
Water is one of the elements that underMālikī and al-Sˇāﬁ↪ī traditions cannot be the object
of exclusive appropriation, but only of possession. This constitutes the key to understand-
ing the limitations placed upon water as the object of legal transaction under Muslim
law.
The way in which Islamic mad
¯
hab – in this case, the doctrine taught by the followers
of the scholar Mālik – avoided having to resolve issues related to water ownership was by
referring back to the provisions contained in the text of the Koran. This avoided doctrinal
discussions that, already under Roman law had led Ulpian to make a statement with
regard to the opinion of Cassius, Labeon, and Ophilius on the exercise of the actio aquae
pluviae arcendae (rainwater retention action).6 In fact, informed opinions in subsequent
periods, and of Justinian tradition, were also characterized by being suited and adapted to
particular moments and speciﬁc water problems. This was a pattern that continued from
Roman times until the 7th century, the time of the territorial expansion of Islam across
Syria and Palestine (places under control of the declining Byzantine Empire).
Exactly as it had happened on the other side of the Mediterranean before the 8th
century, Andalusi law deﬁned that the water of rivers was not an object that anyone could
‘appropriate’. It is for this reason that Ibn Rusˇd explained the scope of irrigation shifts
in the use of water, and the system that was developed through different devices;7 Al-
Wansˇarīsī compiled several fatwas of Abū ↩Abd Allāh Muh
˙





affār (d. 811/1408–1409), in which he stated that the people who owned lands on the
banks of rivers could simply ‘use’ water to irrigate in accordance with their identiﬁed turn.
Turns were allotted in correspondence with their location, beginning with those situated
in the uppermost areas and then continuing with those who were in subsequently lower
locations, pursuant to Sunnah and custom (‘urf). In this case, two sources underpinned
this general principle in water ‘right of use’ matters.8
Formore than six centuries, the guiding principles weremaintainedwithout interrup-
tion in terms of proportional water distribution and allocation.9 This is what happened
in Lorca; twenty-four years had gone by since Lorca was taken over by the Christians
and the king urged his people to respect the way in which water was ‘allocated’ between
5 Gebir 1853, 94–95.
6 Mommsen and Krüger 1993, Di.39.3.0. “De aqua et aquae pluviae arcendae”.
7 Ibn Rusd 2000, 313–323; Al-Sˇa↩bī 1992, 118–122.
8 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 5.7–8.
9 Alfonso X 1298; Escobar 1921, 35–42.
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community members, represented by the council of Lorca. This piece of information is
important to justify the continuity of a system that had remained in force for centuries
amongst farmworkers and water irrigators, as well as the way in which water was used: by
means of allocation. Neither this document nor other contemporary documents mention
the sale of water or prices for water. This peculiar fact, however, does not reduce the
importance of other modalities of water allocation, such as the auction10 of surplus water
between themembers of a community, pursuant to the rules that were operational within
the framework of Andalusi law.Water allocation had to be performed in an organized way
that took into consideration the needs of the landowners situated in the upper parts of
the watercourse ﬁrst, regardless of whether it was a river, an irrigation ditch, or a rainwater
dam on a piece of land on higher grounds. In any of these cases, the water which was not
used for the foreseen purposes − irrigation and consumption − had to be allowed to ﬂow
past, so that the same ‘right of use’ and enjoyment could be ensured for the other water
users downstream.
As for the concept of water ownership and possession, the application of theories
about the ‘right to use’ for water in al-Andalus aimed to obtain the highest possible yield
from the lands that had passed fromHispanic-Visigoth sovereignty to Caliphal rule; more
precisely, initially under Abbasid sovereignty, through the establishment of governor-
ships and provinces ruled by emirs. Maximization sought to provide new settlers with
land so that they could work it and ensure their own survival and that of their families. It
was a situation that favored irrigation as a common model amongst the autochthonous
population and the newly arrived people. The model, which has remained in use for
centuries in the peninsular territory,11 did so because it was a system, “which had worked
since ancient times”,12 according to Segura Graiño. This productive model did not envis-
age exercising a right of ownership with regard to water, since that right is only recognized
by Allāh, but it did refer to the use and the right to utilize water to one’s own advantage.
The only right that could be exercised in terms of ownership, was related to water that
came from the rain, and which found itself stopped or dammed byman’s actions, without
limiting the moral obligation of supplying water to whoever urgently needed it.
The legal basis that prevents the exercise of exclusive property over water is that larger
watercourses − the origin of which refers back to divine will − have no owners and do not
belong to anyone (ğayr mamlūk);13 this category includes the water of large rivers, their
tributaries, and seawater. According to tradition, Muh
˙
ammad speciﬁed that, following
God’s will, nobody could own water or plants and ﬁre on an absolute basis, and any
individual was allowed to utilize them on a private basis; in other words, in the same
way that a Muslim is considered a ‘brother’ of all other Muslims, they all should share
the use and enjoyment of common elements, such as water, trees, and ﬁre. Nevertheless,
Abū ↩Ubayd (d. 838) clariﬁed that this principle had an exception for those things that
Muh
˙
ammad had categorized as being of exclusive protection.14 From a legal point of view,





everybody can enjoy water in an egalitarian way, without anybody being allowed to
deprive others of it in an exclusive way. Even so, following Ibn ↩Allāq (ca.15th century),
the possibility existed to exercise a right over part of this common good when it was held
in a container.15
10 Barceló 1989, 57.
11 Segura Graiño and Miguel Rodríguez 2000, 23 390.
12 Segura Graíño 1984, 1013.
13 Maíllo Salgado 2005, 218–219.
14 Ibn Sallām 2003, 289.
15 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 8. 28–29.
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In the light of the traditions on the prohibition against selling water, and using the
opinions of both the author of Kufa, Sufyān ibn Sa↩īd ↩Uyayna (d. 198/813), cited by Abū
↩Ubayd,16 and the founder of the Mālikī School, Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795), as a reference,
the ‘owners’ of water were not entitled to deny it to any traveler, or to anyone who needed
it for themselves or for their animals.17 It also could not be denied to neighbors, not even
based on the existing need to irrigate a piece of land, thus, laying down the rules for water
access according to the Mālikī School. The doctrine provides speciﬁc examples that were
in force for centuries.
Indeed, the right to water amongst Muslims was that everyone should have access to
it in order to address their needs. Consequently, those who inhabited areas located on the
banks of a river course, who used the water that ﬂowed through that course, could not
be regarded as the owners or proprietors of the river or the water in their surroundings.
However, water could be destined to the service of the households, the washing of latrines,
and also the ﬁlling of cisterns; furthermore, water could equally beneﬁt wells through
inﬁltration, bringing utility not only to those owning the infrastructure in which the
water was accumulated or stored, but also to whoever approached the infrastructure for
a drink or to provide water to their animals.
Mālik had not yet died when Abū ↩Ubayd expressed his opinion about water that
overﬂowed its banks and was kept in containers or skins. Abū ↩Ubayd explained that
it was possible to sell such water, according to the jurists specialized in the matter of
ﬁqh; in this case, the person who gathered the water and carried it acquired the right
to use the water in return for paying a corresponding tax. Nevertheless, in the words of
the Abū ↩Ubayd, this opinion was based on a different chain of authority or isnād, thus,
providing an idea about the diversity of criteria and opinions relating to a singular case.18
As a support for this new criterion, Abū ↩Ubayd took as his reference a tradition traced
to a chain of authority of ﬁve people, all of them well known and credible (Nun’aym
ibn H
˙
ammād heard about this from Baqiyya ibn al-Walīd, and the latter heard about it
from Abū Bakr ibn ↩Abd Allāh ibn Abī Maryam, who heard about it from al-Mashīkha,
who in turn knew about it from the Prophet Muh
˙
ammad). According to them, the sale of
water was prohibited, with the only exception beingwater that was transported in a device
built for the purpose of transporting water. Therefore, despite the existence of a general
principle supported by traditions considered to be reliable, due to the short distance of the
chain of authority (only ﬁve people), as time went by (in less than ﬁfty years) exceptions
or looser interpretations were also included. These exceptions were based on traditions
communicated through longer chains of authority and, thus, susceptible to having some
of their elements questioned due to a lack of credibility or the inability to verify the
truthfulness of what was transmitted, making them weak in terms of content or style
(da’if ). Nevertheless, in the light of water-related case law, signs exist of the application of
these exception or loose interpretations, which were suggested to specialists and experts
in the science of ﬁqh (‘ilm al-ﬁqh) for the proper application of the law.
In the event of separation of one portion of water for the beneﬁt of a particular user,
or of discovery of a well or spring in the country estate or rural land (hawz19) of an owner,
Islamic law protected the exercise of private ownership, albeit while also establishing a
moral obligation to share thewater resource in favor of those whomight need it to survive,
both for consumption and tomaintain their crops. In fact, the term hawz refers to the piece
of land over which legal possession is exercised through ownership and the intention to
exercise effective power with regard to it. Therefore, the property had neither an absolute
16 Fierro 1998, 70.
17 Anas 1982, 36.25 and 36.26.33, 346.
18 Ibn Sallām 2003, 293.
19 Maíllo Salgado 2005, 127.
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nor an exclusive character for anyone. This criterion found its justiﬁcation in the tradition
narrated by Abū Huraira, who transmitted from the Prophet that, on Doomsday, Allāh
would not take three kinds of individuals into consideration for salvation or Paradise; for
these people, he would neither purify them or impose a severe punishment. The ﬁrst of
these individuals was a person who, having an excess of water, denied it to the travelers





1374), who focused on a different hadith that advised against depriving any human being
of water, and also advised against depriving crops and cattle of water, due to the utility
brought about by its use.21 This maxim appears in many of the consultations made by
experts in Andalusi law over time.22
Something similar happened when the water came from a source or spring; the doc-
trine conﬁrmed the right users had to extract water, since exclusive ownership over the
source did not belong to any individual, nor to the public authority that was supposed
to ensure the supply of water for everybody. The right of exploitation fell upon beneﬁ-
ciaries, a right that was passed down from one generation to the next, both for human
drinking and so their cattle could drink. Most importantly, the passage of time did not
limit anyone’s right to access water; neither did it consolidate an exclusive right over a
portion, or all, of the water when water was needed.
An interesting aspect to consider is determining the space around a well or source
destined to ensure a water supply. In this sense, Abū ↩Ubayd recorded a tradition fromAbū
Hurayra, in which he determined that the space surrounding a well had to be forty cubits,
so that animals could drink the water. This was because the Prophet said that 25 cubits
had to be reserved around a newly-created well and 15 cubits around an old well, whereas
the space around a water source had to be three hundred cubits and around a spring used
for irrigation, six hundred cubits. These measures were also discussed by other jurists,
such as Al-Dār↩qut
˙




, and it was even speciﬁed
that the space around a well had to cover the same distance in all directions, at least with
regard to newly createdwells. However, this opinionwas not unanimous; according to Ibn
Sˇihāb’s testimony, the communities who used such water resources and who established a
measure of ﬁve hundred cubits – as a maximum surface of exploitation or utility of water
from a source orwall – had the right to keep it forever. Abū ↩Ubayd conﬁrmed this distance
of ﬁve hundred cubits and defended the extension of forty cubits as the exploitation limit
for a well, at which nobody could be deprived of the right to water and to irrigation.23
The concern of jurists, in this regard, focused on arguing against water users who did
not own land but beneﬁted from water for irrigation and/or cattle feeding, from being
able to sell surplus water; the prohibition was supported by the fact that if they did so,
they were committing one of the actions forbidden for salam sales, insofar as selling water
meant speculating on a public-use good. Any product – outside the salam business − had
to be sold for a price in return; in the case of products subject to salam, the only possibility
available was an exchange for products of the same kind and quality, without any chance
to increase prices, as this would imply committing usury. The disposal or transfer of water
had to be done in return for something, and then the price that might eventually be
paid for it would be deemed forbidden, since water has no value in itself because it is a
necessity ‘good’ that cannot be denied to anyone; let alone in the case of water coming
from large watercourses such as rivers and tributaries on their way to the sea. This being
so, doctrine determined that the correct, convenient thing to do (h
˙
asan) was to prohibit
the sale of water, as well as the sale of excess water that a user had at any given moment.




22 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 8.128.
23 Ibn Sallām 2003, 285.
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This opinion was upheld by Abū ↩Ubayd, according to a tradition attributed to Dāwūd
ibn ↩Abd al-Rah
˙





ārī (d. 760–761) according to al-Qāsim ibn Muh
˙
ammad, was that all of them
were aware of water intermittence and ﬂuctuation that resulted in situations of scarcity,
like those suffered by the inhabitants of al-Ans
˙
ār who constantly demanded solutions
to their problems by the Prophet. This prohibition was strengthened by other traditions.
One of themwas transmitted by ↩Ā↩iˇsa, the Prophet’s wife, who related what Muh
˙
ammad
had said to ↩Abd Allāh ibn Amr about the prohibition of selling water collected in a well,
as well as the prohibition against denying water to anyone who claimed it was needed
to meet their needs.24 Other, more widespread, traditions with great prestige amongst
Muslims provide support for this general prohibition. An example was narrated by Yazīd
from the testimony of two individuals who heard a woman called Buhaysa talking about
the response her father had received from the Prophet; he said that certain goods, more
precisely water and salt, could not be legally denied anyone in any amount; and whoever
abided by this premise would beneﬁt both on earth and in God’s eyes.
Therefore, supplying water was an obligation for anyone who received water; it was
a beneﬁcial action for their fellow human beings and, additionally, praiseworthy from a
spiritual point of view. First in line for water were the walkers and travelers, who had the




āb said, and H
˙
ajjāj transmitted. The
reasoning for this lies in the fact that they depended on the vicissitudes of the way, they
were subject to a lack of foresight, and an uncertainty of ﬁnding water along the way to
meet their needs.
Taking up the issue of special protection by the Prophet, it is worth mentioning that
the land destined to feed the horses utilized in war activities and the water that arrived in
country or rural estates deserved his attention.25
In addition to these prioritized needs, the aspects related to growing land fruits raised
issues about the rights of other claimants. From a general point of view, those who farmed
with irrigation were situated ﬁrst in the ranking of water users and beneﬁciaries, with
the aim not only of meeting their survival needs but also of producing for others. At a
more speciﬁc level, the needs of the latter were less relevant.26 Being aware of the needs
generated from working the land, especially from the work carried out by the people of
al-Ans
˙
ar, the Prophet decided that no one in charge of the irrigation of the crops could
sell water, even if they received an offer to do so; instead, they had to wait for their turn
or apply for a shift, if needed to irrigate their land. Even when the water arrived, this
person would have to respect the turns of their neighbors located in the areas closer to
the watercourse. This is exactly what Muh
˙
ammad resolved with regard to the demand
for surplus water stemming from the irrigation of the vineyard of Allāh ibn ↩Amr al-↩Aˇs
˙at-T
˙





ā↩if’s portion of water for irrigation. The portion of irrigation water was
calculated with a perforated metallic bowl (qild) that was used as a measuring device. This
device was described in the 11th century by al-Sˇā’bī as a facility used by the irrigators




ār.27 Al-Sˇā’bī answered a
questioner interested in how to distribute water (qisma al-mi’āh) during the day and night
that he should use the qild.
The action of irrigation (from the Arabic root q-l-d28) was possible after having deter-
mined that water was a necessity good and once the number of people who requested it
24 Ibn Sallām 2003, 287–288.
25 Ibn Sallām 2003, 292.
26 Ibn Sallām 2003, 288–292.
27 Ibn Sallām 2003, 288–292; Al-Sˇa↩bī 1992, 122.
28 Corriente 1977, 139.
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for such a purpose had been speciﬁed. This procedure was not applied to the territories
that produced crops in summer without the need to use man-made irrigation systems
(ba’lī). In this sense, there is a justiﬁcation for the allocation or distribution (qisma) to be
carefully regulated by the taking of turns, which was an approach applied in territories
inhabited by Muslims, as described by al-Māwardī (d. 1058).29 However, water was not
only taken by turns but also ‘came by turns’ (taqālad). I recognize three modalities of
irrigation: ﬁrstly, rotation in the use of water every certain number of days − foreseen for
cases with a small number of irrigators − and for a number of hours if there were many
users; secondly, when faced with a dispute over access to ﬂuctuating and/or scarce water,
the ﬁxation of lots which were assigned and enjoyed, following an order established on
the basis of proximity to the source and the need for aminimum amount of water to cover
demands associated with growing crops, punishing those who violated or failed to respect
the established turns; and thirdly, digging an irrigation ditch or canal once a communal
agreement had been achieved over the proportion of water necessary to meet the existing
needs.30 The cut-off of the water ﬂowwas employed – even nowadays in areas of irrigation
it is based upon traditional systems – through the adufa, a ﬂoodgate that is operated by
the irrigator via manual action.31 The distribution of water with people taking turns was
considered one of the main systems for maximizing use and sustainability by Ibn Rusˇd in
al-Andalus, and one of the main topics focused on by scholars in their fatwā.32
These and many other answers along the same lines were used before the lack of
water permit to recognize the irrigators’ capacity to manage water following fair and
proportional allocation criteria. It was indeed so because the irrigators or farmers (al-tānī)
were entitled to manage and administer the water that came to their piece of land, in
order to meet the needs of their crops and cattle. This entitlement was formally organized
and regulated according to the principles already mentioned and repeatedly stressed by
experts in law through the issuance of their opinions and answers to speciﬁc consultations.
This was the accepted practice amongst water users and these were the rights that were
defended in the context of the community, even after the arrival of the Christians.33 This
can, for example, be seen in the documents on the conquest of Castille and Aragon.When
the conquest was already well under way in Aragon, Alfonso el Batallador granted the
‘good Moors’ of Tudela (Buenos moros de Tudela) the maintenance of all the officers and
leaderships positions (alcudia, algalifos, alforques, and alfaques) for the governance of their
“industries and chores in orchards and irrigated areas” in 1115.34 Similarly, Alfonso X, of
the Christians, and Moors of Lorca (Kingdom of Castille), recognized the main role of
the municipal council in defending the interests of water users and beneﬁciaries, as had
been done thus far. They recognized the general regime for the right of water use, at least
with respect to the construction of ditches, canals, and drainages systems,35 in the face
of claims of the right to water not being considered on the same terms and conditions
as under Andalusi law36 as had been explained. Custom and traditions related to water,
led the king to make a statement and explicitly recognize the ‘right of use’ for individuals
to receive the water that they might eventually need, forbidding the monopolization and
private retention of water by the landlords:
29 Al-Māwardī 2006, passim.
30 Al-Māwardī 2006, 198-9; Martínez Almira forthcoming.
31 Pando Villarroya 1997, 71; Corriente 1977, 261.
32 Ibn Rusd 2000, 2, 317–323.
33 Alfonso X 1298. English translation by Adriana Gil Martinez.
34 Muñoz y Romero 1847, 1.414–417.
35 Möller 2016, 12–19.
36 Barceló 1989, 48–49.
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Please know that the town council of Lorca complained that the lords of the lands
donated by the king have all the water and do not let it ﬂow out of their orchards
neither to grind wheat nor for any other thing; thus losing the bread […]. I am
astonished if this is so. Hence I urge you and I command you to go and see the
general condition, and divide the water and distribute it among the community
by day and by [time], so that there is no strife for this reason from now onwards.
Issued by the King in Seville on Sunday 23 September 1306. I, Pedro Gonçalvez,
scribe of Garcia Dominguez, notary of the King in Andalusia, had this written.37




3.1 Principles of the distribution of water
The most visible expression of the communal nature that water had – and continues to
have − can be veriﬁed by the way in which it is accessed, giving the opportunity of every
user to access it, for any need that they may eventually face. A hierarchy can be imposed
upon that access according to a series of criteria and rules commonly accepted and guaran-
teed by tradition-based laws. The importance of the community becomes evident in terms
of the observance of the rules and provisions by all involved in water use and enjoyment,
and in the respect for the people in charge of monitoring and supervising that the system
worked properly, in accordance with the customs and practices amongst Muslims and
the Andalusi population. In this respect, it must be stressed that in this framework of re-
lationships related to the ‘right of use’, the doctrine places themost emphasis on providing
responses case-by-case, based upon the right that everyone has to water, and issuing orders
oriented towards the exclusive exercise of that right. There appears to be a turning point
with respect to other legal systems in force around the peninsular territory,38 especially
in the moment in which Muslim sovereignty gave way to the Christian one, but even
when faced with this new situation, kings assumed the role of assigning the ownership of
a ‘good’ that belonged to them as a conquest right. Nevertheless, under no circumstances
could they deny it arbitrarily; it was attested for centuries that the authority exercised a
discretionary policy in favor of users, either laymen or ecclesiastics, whowere always given
priority to satisfying their needs ﬁrst. In fact, the criterion of shared beneﬁt and right to a
‘good’ was maintained, the proper administration of which was everyone’s responsibility.
It could not be demanded only by the beneﬁcent rulers, but also by all beneﬁciaries.
According to al-Sˇāﬁ↪ī, the exact limits of a river in a barren land were determined
by custom.39 The limits of an irrigation ditch had to be ﬁxed in a similar way, since
it was considered an inland river, or derived from an inland river. Abū H
˙
anifa deﬁned
the limits of a river as the sides on which mud was deposited; in the opinion of Abū
Yūsuf, the ﬁxation of the limits or edges of an irrigation ditch took into account the
37 Alfonso X 1298. In the original: “Sepades que el conçeio de Lorca se me embiaron querellar que los
sennores de los donadios tienen toda la agua que la non dexan salir de sus huertas afuera pora pan nin
pora otra cosa ninguna, fet por esso] que pierden los panes ca […]. Et si asi es so ende marauillado. Ende
uos ruego et uosmando que uayades y et que ueades en qual guisa es, et partidles la agua comunalmientre
por dias et por [tiempos], de guisa que ninguna contienda non aya daqui adelante sobrestá razón Et
non fagades end al et fazer [mié en] ello seruicio. Dada en Seuilla, el rey la mando domingo XXIII dias
de septiembre, era de mili et CCC et VI annos. Yo Pedro Gonçaluez, escriuano de Garcia Domínguez,
notario del rey en la Andaluzia, la ﬁz escreuir.” – English translation by Adriana Gil Martinez.
38 Villaba Sola 2016, 82–94.
39 Al-Māwardī 2006, 197.
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surface that retained ”the water and prevented it to overﬂowing.”40 Islamic law deﬁned
a number of methods to create a balanced and proportional use of the water destined
for legal purposes. The relationship between user and water can be veriﬁed through the
ownership over the country estate or the piece of land through which the water ﬂowed,
which contained or retained it. The ‘right of use’ corresponded to whoever had taken
possession (h
˙
awz41) of a place or land and was entitled to use and enjoy the things that
were located within it, like the water of a well or spring on the land. It also fell upon these
landowners to use the surplus water to irrigate or revitalize barren lands (ard
˙
-baīda).
However, in this case, the doctrine discussed whether the ownership of surplus water
belonged to those who exercised ownership over the lands the watercourse was situated
upon, or at the source of a river or spring, or, instead, if the water had to be allocated to
anyone who requested it. The question, repeated by Andalusi claimants before different
scholars, was expressed under three cases or possible means of resolving the situation:
a) Firstly, they considered whether the surplus water of a piece of land owned by an
individual could be proportionally distributed in equal parts between claimants.
b) Secondly, they considered whether the surplus water could be proportionally allo-
cated to the extent of the lands that they worked.
c) A third possibility subject to assessment was to follow an order governed by the
proximity of the country estate or piece of land to the water source, or to the piece
of land with an excess of water.






ammad ibn ↩Abd ↩Allāh al-Yalisūti42 accord-
ing to the right of those who owned or farmed the lands, to whom the best right over
water use and allocation belonged, where applicable. Sayydi argued that those who had
no land but neededwater could not request it, insofar as it had no utility at all; in the event
that they did have lands being used for crops, he referred back to the previously explained
Mālikī doctrine, which stated that the right towaterwas acquired on the basis of proximity
to water or to the source or spring it came from. In his view, owners had the privilege
to irrigate their crops, beginning with those situated in the uppermost country estates,
and so on and so forth, until reaching those whose property was located furthest down




, this rule dated back to the times of the
Prophet, when he established this order for the beneﬁt of the inhabitants of Medina, who
aspired to use the water from the Mahzur and Mazinib watercourses. A similar argument
was made by al-Qābisī, in response to someone who asked him who was the owner of
the brushwood that arrived that was carried by the river ﬂow; the answer was clear, the
sediment belonged to the owner of the land that the river crossed, because “the owner of
the water ﬂow only has the right to the water passage, and nothing else.”43
Hence, the method followed three different modalities of water usage.
a) Firstly, users had to ‘draw lots’ for the use of the water or schedule it by rotation
every few days when there were not a lot of users or every few hours when many
users had to share this ‘good’. Should a dispute arise, lots had to be drawn in order
to determine the order of use; each person had to assume and accept their turn, as it
was forbidden for them to meddle with the water of the other co-owners or to limit
it.
40 Al-Māwardī 2006, 199.
41 Corriente 1997, 143.
42 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 5. 132–133.
43 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 9.44.
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b) The second method consisted of dividing the water on a wooden board spread
across the river from one side to another, with openings that let water come through
according to speciﬁc quotas or the number of participations, so that each user could
take their proportion of water in their turn.
c) As for the third method, it envisaged that each user would dig an irrigation canal
with a speciﬁc volume, either by general agreement or in proportion to the surface
area of their properties; in this case, they were supposed to have a fair or reasonable
proportion (or allocation quota), in keeping with that of the other co-users, neither
having a greater or lesser proportion than the others. Nobody was allowed to bring
forward or delay the timing of the opening of their irrigation ditch (canal), and
likewise, no inhabitants of a street were allowed to open the access or exit door
according to their own will. After all, moving the door opening forward meant
that the person whose turn it was would lose a part of their water allocation and
the person who opened it earlier would beneﬁt from the water that came through
the irrigation ditch before their assigned time, resulting in them obtaining an extra
advantage (at the expense of another, which was forbidden).
Proximity to the source or the spring as a determining factor for utilizing the water, to the
detriment of other claimants, was not accepted by all jurists. Al-Badjī (d. 1041), who was
born in Badajoz and died in Almeria, made a comment about this hadith or interpretation,
justifying that such an order had to bear inmind when each one of the lands started being
farmed.44 Expressed differently, in addition to proximity to the spring or source, it was
necessary to respect the priority of the timing of the cultivation of the land and, therefore,
those who ﬁrst revitalized the soil would be more entitled to use the water, considering
the beneﬁt that they expected to obtain from their work; and so on and so forth. On the
other hand, if two farmers planted at the same time, then they would both have the same
right to the water, and only had to abide by the ﬁrst of the criteria. Notwithstanding the
preferential right of the country estates on higher grounds, if the farmer of a piece of land
located further down the water course had begun growing the land before the one located
above it, that farmer would be allowed to exercise his ‘right of use’ of the water to beneﬁt
the crops already initiated in the event of water scarcity.
The Granada-born muftí Abū ↩Abd Allāh Muh
˙





811/1408–1409) was consulted about the right of the irrigator of a ditch to use the water
for lands sown in the summer and autumn.45 According to the doctrine, water had to
be distributed between all inhabitants of a location,46 regardless of whether they utilized
it for productive purposes; however, an experienced jurist was asked about the legality
of the users of an irrigation ditch that, contrary to the widely accepted criterion, did not
divide thewater between everyone but only between thosewho had sown their lands. This
practice or modality, thus, contravened ‘the use’ accepted by everybody, in short, custom.
His answer highlighted two closely related issues: the ﬁrst one being that since the water
of the river did not belong to anyone, the irrigation ditch that might deviate the water
for the beneﬁt of other pieces of land was not ‘owned’ by anyone either, and the second,
that each and every person was entitled to take advantage of the water, and to utilize it for
productive purposes, consequently for their plantations, trees, and any other needs.
It can be inferred from this answer that no one had the right to deny water to anyone
who might need it for any purpose, both if it was used immediately or if a decision was
made to do so in the middle- or long-run. However, those who had no intention to use
the water as a means to obtain fruits or products from the land were not allowed to deny
44 Montero Muñoz 2009, 264.
45 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 7. 7–8.
46 Al-Māwardī 2006, 215.
44 Magdalena Martínez Almira
that same right to those who sowed the land; the law guaranteed the utilization of the
water ‘needed’ to irrigate and to properly obtain the fruits.
This discussion, additionally, permitted the speciﬁcation of two other controversial
aspects that could cause conﬂicts to arise. The ﬁrst one of them being that river water
could not be appropriated by anyone; all individuals were allowed to take advantage of
river water to irrigate their lands, pursuant to a prior agreement and in their established
turn. In this sense, jurists referred back to “the sunna and custom practiced by men,” or
depending on “the use and practice of the place where the allocation needed to be made;
and in this case, nobody could contradict what was laid down in the ‘mutually agreed’
upon provisions.” 47 This is an essential fact that is needed to understand the role played
by users pertaining to ‘irrigation communities’ or ‘water user communities’. The second
issue that could generate conﬂict, had to do with the possibility that a beneﬁciary of a
water right that had been transferred or who handed over his ‘right of use’ of the water
(in ancient Andalusi sources the word used is taxada). This possibility was exclusively
recognized for someonewho had acquired the right over thewater at the same time as they
obtained their land (thus, creating a link between the idea of a water right and owning
a piece of land, making them impossible to separate from one other), or to whoever had
bought a piece of land that was reported to have a source of water or spring from which
water emanated.
Andalusi doctrine thoroughly discussed such cases. Therefore, an agreement reached
between the users of a source of water or a spring prevailed over the right to irrigate
the lower lands that were under production. Nevertheless, these agreements were not
operational in the case of rainwater. It was not legal to undertake to make an agreement
about accumulation of rainwater to the detriment of any user, according to the opinion





and Ibn ↩Abd ↩Allāh al-Yalisūti.49 This agreement insisted on the ‘right of use’ and the
effective arrival of water, according to the agreed upon turn taking (mudda).50 Seeking to
justify the need to distribute water and make it easier for everyone to be able to use the
water and take advantage of it, Ibn ↩Allāq clariﬁed his stance regarding the right pro indiviso
of the owners of a source if they shared the water pursuant to a previously established
convention or agreement, and the possibility to beneﬁt from the quota assigned to anyone
who, despite being a party to that agreement, did not exercise their right. The aforesaid
author concluded that priority had to be given to the interested parties, present or absent,
legally of age or minors and women, provided that a representative acted on behalf of
those whose capacity was determined to be ‘limited’;51 and any agreement in this respect
could be enforced.
Water utility stemmed here from the right that each of the users had to exploit the
water for the beneﬁt of their respective pieces of land and the agreement that they had
reached with regard to the proportional allocation of the water. An allocation that was
by no means viable if the origin of the water was a mountain or from rain, insofar as, in
that event, water could not be stored and no ownership could be exercised over it on an
exclusionary basis.
47 Al-Māwardī 2006, 200.
48 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 8. 27–28; Boum and Park 2016, 247.
49 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 5. 133.
50 Ibn Rusd 2000, 2, 317–323.
51 Ibn Rusd 2000, 2, 317–323.
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3.2 Distribution of water: a ‘legal business’
The right to utilize water for irrigation under the conditions described above extended
over time, without it being possible to deprive people who had used that resource for a
speciﬁc number of years of that right. This section refers to the right of a person who
beneﬁts from an easement (marafaq), even though a certain disparity of criteria among
Mālikī followers exists in this respect. The term that describes this type of legal business is
hadama (مدﺧ 52); the meaning of the Arabic root of this word (h-d-m)means to serve, to be
at the service of, or to work for or amongst others. Additionally, it can mean to work the
land (مدﺧضرﻻأ), ormore precisely, servitude, insofar as it refers to one’s subordination to
someone else, expressed through the term hādīmya. It must be pointed out that, according
to Corriente, the letter ذ is used instead of د for the term servitude, being the one that
appears in the root, to serve.53Moreover, servitude of aqueduct corresponds to the concept
haqq marūr al-miy’ah, whereas easement is haqq al-marūr. These concepts emphasize the
right (haqq) of the user over the object in question (the water way or the water). This
analysis becomes interesting because the verb rafaqameans to help or assist, and the noun
rāfqa means company or society, and the same term can even mean company, group, or
party.54 Already in the speciﬁc context of law and business, the doctrine of Ibn Lubb,
and more precisely the sources for the application of law in al-Andalus,55 refer to the free
granting or al-irfāq, which is the modality accepted within Islam to avoid committing
usury or riba, instead of access-easement. In legal terms, andwith regard to the contractual
relationship between the interested parties, the concept al-irfāq describes a business that
raises some issues, at least in relation to servitude in Roman law. The following question
may, therefore, be posed: Is it possible to speak about servitude in the same sense as it is
used in Roman law?56 Or instead, is servitude in Islamic law an association of individuals
participating in a business on an equal footing – according to equality and proportionality
criteria – rather than via subordination? In either case, it seems advisable to clarify some
of the elements that characterize this type of business, concerning water laws.
From a theoretical point of view, the individuals interested in water share the use and
enjoyment of a common good; they actually form part of a ‘society’ based on a contractual
agreement: a mixed business which has both sale elements – transfer of a property –
and elements related to the transfer of the ‘right of use’. The capacity to have the item
available corresponds to the partners or participants in a business, without the partner
to whom the thing originally belonged to losing control. Together with this modality,
Islamic law allowed for the formalization of businesses associated with the protection or
management of goods belonging to someone else; these legal relationships correspond to
the mandate and deposit – two special institutions closely related to charitable contracts,
in this case. Free and charitable businesses are varied and seek only to provide a beneﬁt
to the other party, not to obtain compensation. Donation (hiba) is the standard contract
and similarly we can ﬁnd the mutual contract (qard
˙
); a contract which theoretically has
to be free to avoid incurring ribā or usury. Amongst the different modalities appears the
‘commodatum’, a rarely relevant contract in the works of the early times of Islam in al-
Andalus that refers only to the assignment of a certain amount ofmoney to administer and





appears related to what Chalmeta-Marugán57 identiﬁed with the ‘commodatum’ or qirād
˙
,
52 Corriente 1977, 201.
53 Corriente 1977, 202.
54 Corriente 1977, 304.
55 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 6. 30.
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in which special attention must be paid to the agreement about the beneﬁts for each of
the parties involved. This is a contract that consists of giving or assigning a thing to do
business, with the obligation that that thing be returned, with the condition that it will







ammād ibn ↩Abd ↩Allah al-Yalisūti and Ibn Lubb.58
As a matter of fact, a distinction can be drawn in terms of water use between the vol-
untary association of water users and the relationship of subordination between whoever
had the right to utilize the water resource and decided to share it or assign it to a third
party (mūdil). This concept refers to the assignee of a usufruct right, and therefore, when
it comes to water, to the person who decides, and is a term included in the Collection
of Andalusi sayings carried out by Alonso del Castillo, as Corriente explains.59 In this
last case, a variety of limitations existed because the business association generated by the
persons interested in water did not allow price ﬁxing on this good that was considered a
public, common utility. No price could be placed on water, since it had a public utility;
otherwise, it would lead to a forbidden enrichment (ribā). This is the key to understanding
the limitations that existed when it came to establishing servitude or exceptional charge
over a country estate or a piece of land for the beneﬁt of another, especially when dealing
with water, to which everyone was entitled and which nobody could be denied.
Ibn ↩Allāq argued that, should a group of individuals agree to use the water from a
torrent or another water source, and the landowner who initially beneﬁted from it lost
their right to it, water ownership would pass to a third party. This would be true even if
the land remained unirrigated for more than thirty years and others took advantage of
that volume of ﬂow following an authorization and canalization, and even if the original
owner sold the land to a third party. Neither the ﬁrst owner nor the second owner would
be able to deprive users of the water that they used pursuant to the initial agreement,
along with the means and resources built for that purpose. This acquired right prevailed
regardless of the time elapsed since the sale of the property through which the water
ﬂowed. After all, the object subject to transactionwas the land or country estate, regardless
of the water that might correspond to it, and which could by no means – according
to the aforementioned source – be separated from the land that it initially served or
through which it ﬂowed. Indeed, according to Ibn ↩Allāq, if land irrigation depended
on an agreement about the use of a community, public good, the owner of the country
estate through which the water ﬂowed was not entitled to raise any objections, since this
was the criterion upheld since the times of Caliph ↩Umar.60
Andalusi legal experts settled some of the issues raised based on opinions that differed
from that of the most renownedMālikī, as had the jurists of early times, like Abū ↩Ubayd,
a fact that generated conﬂicting positions between the orthodox members of the Mālikī
School. A number of cases deserve special attention because they mostly refer to the
possibility of the creation of enforced servitude in regards to rivers (nahar ya’ra) and over
the water ﬂowing through them. Additionally, demands were also made in relation to
water from wells (bī’r/pl. ābār61), from public springs, and from resources that ﬂowed
freely along paths that were naturally or artiﬁcially exploited and had the status of ‘public
wells’ (sabīl/asbila). Furthermore, Andalusi law endorsed free access to water for anyone
who might need it, in accordance with the legal interpretations supported in the qiyās.
58 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, V, 133–134, VI, 308.
59 Corriente 1997, 188-XIII.
60 Ibn Sallām 2003, 286.
61 Corriente 1977, 29; Pocklinton 2016, 2 233–320.
Utility and Beneﬁts of Water in Andalusi Law 47
3.3 Discrepancies in water distribution
Judging by the informed opinions of the ﬁrst jurists, certain discrepancies existed in
relation to the water located in delimited spaces or in spaces where country estate own-
ership could not be questioned. There were two highly controversial cases that explore
this. The ﬁrst one focuses on access to the water stemming from wells in urban spaces,
and the second one, on access and use of water in wells located in open spaces. For the
ﬁrst case, no limits or restriction could be imposed on thirsty people or on those in
need of water, despite the principle according to which the owner was allowed to do
whatever he wanted with this ‘good’ within the limits of his land.62 As for the second
case, access to water could not be prevented either, applying by analogy what had been
determined previously in terms of favoring travelers and the cattle being driven by them.
Nevertheless, before the question of whether it was legal (or whether a right existed) to
receive compensation in return for providing water services, the doctrine advised not to
charge for this service because of its communal nature. It was not possible to demand
compensation for the water from those who dug wells to meet their needs or from those
who provided water to their cattle, on the grounds that the purpose of the water was
to beneﬁt the ‘community of Muslims’. This also held for those digging wells in wild or
deserted areas; compensation could only be requested by the owners of wells that were
situated inside the households or on barren lands. In regards to payment for water in the
proximity of irrigation ditches, Abū ↩Ubayd claimed that nothing speciﬁc had been said.
It is precisely that lack of speciﬁcation that caused the many consultations made by those
who used irrigation and other water users, as recorded in Andalusi documents.
Another institution where water availability was guaranteed, in favor of community
members, was the immobilization of water for charity purposes, h
˙
ubus. This is the so-
called ‘dead hand’ immobilization, endowment, or pious foundation (waqf or h
˙
ubus),
according to Islamic law. A modality that actually meant carrying out a ‘usufruct dona-
tion’, and which very often referred to the water that arrived at mosques, the utility and
beneﬁt of which were destined to accrue to faithful believers. After the loss of Islamic
sovereignty, all of these goods came to be owned by those who held the ownership of the
mosques that had been consecrated as Christian, and accordingly came into the hands of
the Church.
In fact, the h
˙
abus goods allowed for the reservation of certain goods for the commu-
nity, so that community members could beneﬁt from their utilization, with an explicit
prohibition against their use by non-Muslims. This institution was deﬁned by Ibn ↩Arafa
as the “donation of the usufruct over a thing, for the duration thereof, whereas bare own-
ership belonged to the donor”;63 however, there was actually no donation at all, insofar
as no transfer of the ‘good’ effectively took place. Nevertheless, according to the doctrine,
different cases or modalities might arise. The ﬁrst one was that the owner controlled the
h
˙
ubs, or immobilization of the item for their ownbeneﬁt via the introduction of streamlets
or courses with a speciﬁc volume of ﬂow. They were entitled to continue enjoying the use
of the water, without any changes in the modality of the tenure of water. In this case, the
h
˙
ubuswas valid if the immobilization of the asset really occurred (both regardingmovable
and immovable assets, entire goods, and indivisible parts), if it could not be sold, and if
this was done as a liberality between Muslims (since utility had to revert to themselves
and, thus, mosques were the most common subject of h
˙
abūs goods).
This modality could also involve the canalization of water, i.e. the establishment of an
irrigation ditch for the purpose of supplying water to irrigators or to tanners who needed
it to tan their leather, with no room for restrictions or actions that were detrimental to the
62 Ibn Sallām 2003, 286.
63 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, VIII, 313.
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water.64 Secondly, the immobilization of these goods − and especially of water − generated
some doubts whenMuslims arrived in Christian territory; indeed, the goods immobilized
in churches were not licit for Muslims because they had been instituted in the name of
a false God by mistake, and not for the beneﬁt of Allah. As a result of this situation, a




, believed that the ownership of those goods had
to revert to thosewho had pious aims for their faith, claiming them as legitimate owners.65
However, his belief did not apply to goods that had been immobilized in favor of religious
institutions; the owners of these institutions were unknown, or they had abandoned their
lands choosing to expatriate themselves. Following this, the goods were immobilized in
favor of the public treasury (bait al-māl), the ownership of which fell upon the community
of believers, which was supported by the revenues coming from alms-giving (zakāt), the
goods stemming from the territorial tax, the capitation tax paid by non-Muslims, the tithe
on the value of Muslims’ crops, the consignments derived from inter vivos or mortis causa
acts, and even a ﬁfth of the war booty, constituting the consignment known as fay’. This
water management approach, as part of the public utility goods, was maintained without
interruption after the loss of Andalusi sovereignty.
4 Protection of users and officers’ ‘right to use’ for water
Water management and usage also caused havoc in urban areas as well as in the rural
context. In both cases, the ‘right of use’ for some could cause damages to third parties;
when no agreement was reached to ﬁnd an amicable settlement between two parties,
legal actions had to be initiated. Amongst the different cases, the doctrine referred to
the building of drainage systems and rain gutters that had affected someone else’s sit-
uation. Taking the solutions arrived at and the divergence of opinions about the issue
as a reference, it must be highlighted that disparity very often arose due to the lack of
agreement on the deadline to undertake the action against the owner of the infrastructure
that had caused damages to their neighbor. According to the Mālikī School, the statute of
limitations for exercising such a claim was ten years, meaning it was impossible to lodge a
claim after the ten years had elapsed without a formal complaint being officially recorded;







longer statute of limitations, which could be extended up to twenty years, more or less. In
this respect, the Mālikī School suggests a variety of solutions, with judges freely assigning
statutes of limitations, on a discretionary basis, taking into account that both the hadith
and the doctrine that rejected depriving a Muslim of a right that had been granted to
them (the right to water in this case) only because they have not exercised that right for
some time. Therefore, disagreement not only existed about the duration of that statute
of limitations but also about the most important premise: the right to water cannot be
gained by acquisitive prescription or usucapatio.66 This right could also be claimed when
there was an explicit relinquishment of one’s right to water by the person who had the
right to that water, as in the case of the owner of a well in his country estate when he had
not made claims for some time and had remained silent when a third party exercised their
right to the water; this was not determined by the doctrine but subject to the judge’s own
judgment. This issue is controversial when it comes to water, especially when the ‘right of
use’ cannot be exclusivewhen it is to the detriment of whoever has an urgent need to drink
or to ensure that their heads of cattle can drink, or even to irrigate their crops, which had
been established a long time before on the land. The problem arises when one considers
64 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, VIII, 255–256.
65 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, VIII, 319.
66 Martínez Almira 1999, 80–81.
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the object that someone aspires to having a right to: water. The water resource, as a public
and, therefore, common good (mubāq), could not be appropriated on an exclusive basis
and, consequently, no statute of limitations could be provided as a reason to extinguish
someone’s ‘right to use’ due to an individual or a group not exercising that right.
The experts in legal institutions (mu↪āmalāt) were those who resolved legal cases or
conﬂicts relating to water. Many of the cases related to the protection of access to water
and refusing its exclusive use. Kadis were the ones who determined responsibility for
actions taken that were against the law, and the consequences stemming from such ac-
tions. Therefore, a distinction in terms of competences and functions can be made a priori
between kadis –obliged by their capacity as experts in Islamic law, muğtahid, to refer back
to the primary sources − the Koran and the Sunnah67 − and the experts in applied law and,
accordingly in forensic praxis, in the ‘amal, who are known by the termmuqallid. This is a
key point for understanding the competences of several officers, whose titles were retained
after the Christian conquest of Iberian territories, although some titles remained under
the same name, other position names were translated into a Spanish equivalent. The kadi
could appoint disciples, since he applied justice in the name of the sovereign that had
appointed him and this, therefore, explains the appointment of people able to help in
cases of water conﬂict outside of the city and in the suburbs.
When it came to supporting a solution to a legal problem, the muqallid had to refer
to his school’s doctrine, instead of referring to the Koran or the Sunnah. The kadi was
obliged to refer to the primary sources of law; and as far as the Sunnah was concerned, to
the mad
˙
hab or doctrine to which he belonged or in which he had been trained. In other
words, if he passed a sentence based on the doctrine of a mad
˙
hab other than his own, the
sentence could be declared null and void.
The consultations made with experts in the water regime were settled pursuant to
the general principles of the Koran and the Sunnah, placing a special emphasis on the
nature of water as a ‘common good’ (mubaq). The unanimous opinion of Muhammad’s
partners about what he had said and what he did was regularly referenced and justiﬁed
by the testimony of experts in ﬁqh, which is when a unanimous agreement was reached
between Muslim community members, that is, by resorting to the iğma. Analogy (qiyās)
was exclusively utilized in the event of unanimous consensus between experts, and it was
the judge or kadi who had to use that source. This action was not allowed for the ordinary
or ‘pedissequo’ judge (muqallid), who did not have the authority to directly interpret the
Koran and the Sunnah.
The expert in law, muğtahid, had to refer back to the most relevant doctrinal criterion
amongst the members of his mad
˙
hab, and, in this case, notoriety was considered a reason
for reliability. Consequently, all opinions were reinforced by the experience and knowl-
edge of other experts that legitimized the behavior to be followed. The legal foundation,
therefore, lies in the wisdom of many people and not in a singular or individual opinion
(sadd). Additionally, at this level, the value of what is related to the community, the value
of the opinion held and mutually agreed upon by experts, strengthens the nature of the
Islamic community. Once the kadi, in his mission to impart proper justice, has reﬂected
on the informed legal opinions and the grounded answers, and carefully pondering all
the causes and motivations, it was possible for him to adopt an impartial resolution.
Nevertheless, it was possible to count on the advice of experts in ﬁqh, the legal advisers
(mufti), whose task consisted of indicating the most suitable approach in alignment with
doctrine and the law; but it still remained a suggestion, which is why the kadi ﬁnally had
to make a decision without being coerced or inﬂuenced by whoever had advised him.
This degree of discretion stands out as one of the most important characteristics within
67 Koran 4, 61, 68, and 79.
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the framework of Islamic − and also Andalusi – jurisdiction. In fact, there were many
occasions on which a resolution was made based upon a personal decision, according to
what the kadi considered more appropriate for the case being judged, as was recorded by
Ibn Sahl in al-Andalus.68
Even the muqallid, the follower of the doctrine, however, had to resolve cases or con-
ﬂicts when delaying a resolution might result in damages or stop the utilization of water
effectively immediately, utilizing case law as a reference. In this regard, it should be high-
lighted that the urgency required to ﬁnd a resolution, as well as the observance of speciﬁc
and accurate deadlines, helped to reduce the risk of water deprivation and the risk of
spillage and damages that could make water un-drinkable.
This legal basis allows us to better understand the meticulousness applied to the set-
tlement of cases where divergences existed, and which were resolved taking into account
the spatial context where they took place. Legal sources provide some examples that can
help us understand the scope of the Andalusi water regime.
4.1 The purpose of proportions and divisions of the ‘right of use’ of
water
Water utilization and enjoyment by community members was possible thanks to the
institution of qisma, which determined the division of water though turn taking or pro-
portional division of time in which one would receive water; this is the ﬁrst criteria for a
proportional division of the ‘right of use’ for water. Another criterion for the use of water
is the water needs of the user. The enjoyment time speciﬁed in these matters is expressed




āq, “no possibility whatsoever exists
to determine that time,” due to the fact that the word zamān (from the root z-m-n), means
enjoyment “over time.” 69 He, thus, contributes to the lack of determination of the time
a priori, depending on one’s needs and on the utility expected to be brought about via the
water usage.
Nevertheless, the qisma foresees the assignment of the taking of turns and the use of
speciﬁc durations of water access, which is recognized in the expression fī zamān, thus,
making it possible to ﬁx terms or periods of use and enjoyment ‘over time’. It is this last
expression that justiﬁes the assignment of timeframes measured by minutes, hours, or
days, at least with regards to the use of water for production and human consumption
purposes.
Another case which reinforces the principle of the ‘right to use’ for water for every-
body according to the relevant quotas and proportions corresponding to the lot of land
they hold or are associated with, is the case in which there was evidence of a reduction in
that irrigation quota, nas
˙
īb saqy. This compromised the farming yield and, consequently,
the beneﬁts for the people who worked and lived off of that production.70 The decrease
of water, nuqs
˙
ān al-mā, was nothing but a variation corresponding to the conditions of
production established in the contract. This is an essential aspect if we bear in mind
that the determination of the quotas or proportion of water to which the lessor and
the lessee were entitled depended on that production. Furthermore, the altering of those
proportions inﬂuences the amount owed as zakāt71 or compulsory alms. In this sense, the
scope of the loss could be estimated by evaluating the value of the products producedwith
irrigation on themarket, ormaking a calculation based upon the number ofmonths of the
68 Ibn Sahl 1978, 1084, 1088; Al-Nuaymi 1992, 1223, 1228.
69 Martínez Almira 1999, 80.
70 Ibn Sahl 1978, 1088; Al-Nuaymi 1992, 1228; Gebir 1853, 154.
71 Maíllo Salgado 2005, 470–472.
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year when the reduction of water occurred, taking into consideration that summer would
be the most productive period, and that a lack of water during that time of year meant a
loss of a greater value, compared to the loss that would have taken place in the remaining
months. However, in this same regard, Andalusi doctrine assessed the losses derived from
a lack of water according to the characteristics of the products grown through irrigation,
establishing one third as the minimum amount that one could claim for the damage
suffered in the affected area, especially in the case of edible roots.
Another example that explains the universal right to water that existed was studied
by Muh
˙
ammad b. ↩Iyād. When asked about the transfer of an irrigation ditch against
a landowner’s wishes, the jurist from Ceuta answered that despite the practice (‘amal)





his ruling against Muh
˙
ammad b. Maslama, such a transfer was possible under speciﬁc
conditions.72 This position contradicted that of Mudawwana, whose opinion was shared
by ↩Isa b. Dinar andAbūH
˙
anīfa, as opposed toMālik, who did not share their opinion and
did not implement the custom of transferring an irrigation ditch against a landowner’s





ūn).74 Secondly, another possibility existed to transfer
a watercourse, as long as it was officially recorded that the landowner would at no time
claim ownership over the land, the claimant was not entitled to the land, and thirdly, that
the land had come to be the claimant’s simply because he worked it.
The utility brought about by usage of water and the beneﬁt deriving from it had a
special meaning for the contractors of a lease for irrigation,75 the period of validity for the
contract being subordinated to the terms the different parties agreed to, and a timeframe





a’, themeaning of which conveyed the idea of a short duration, a short term




āq. These terms, could not be extended for too
long (mā lam takzūr hidd(an)bi-lā h
˙
add(in)) without justiﬁcation, as per the lease contracts
referred to by Ish
˙
āq.77 During these terms, the musāqī’ had the obligation to dig, work,
and fertilize the land; to irrigate it and clean it; and see to it that the land was looked after
until the maturation of the fruits (ğidād).
Attention was also paid to the relevance of time when it came to the ‘right of use’
and beneﬁt derived from the utilization of water for productive purposes, optimizing
resources. We will, therefore, look at the case of an irrigation contract, musāqāh, on a
land with fruits that could be sold, a practice allowed by the Tunisian Sah
˙
nun (d. 854).78
The musāqāh contract covered the irrigation of lands in which there were trees, vineyards,
grains, cucurbitaceae, and some plants such as rosebushes and cotton, in short, periodic
production plants with fruits that were subject to distribution; contracts on perennial
plants were banned. The business object was by no means water, which, as explained
above, could not be the object of trade;79 instead, it comprised the tasks and activities
required to produce the sought after fruits. Therefore, it was feasible to pay a price, in-
vesting in infrastructure and ﬁnancing the work of the farmer and the people needed to
make the land productive: the agricultural implements and hydrological infrastructures,
draught animals to obtain water from irrigation ditches, and also workers to carry the
water that was taken out of waterwheels and carried to the planted land. If one of these
72 Ibn Rusd 2000, XV, 381-399.
73 Al-Māwardī 2006, 195-197.
74 Ibn Rusd 2000, XV, 401-432.
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necessary elements failed or was lost, the farmer or contractor had to replace it, since he
pledged to do so in the irrigation contract. The payment received was intended to produce
a beneﬁt; in other words, the water was the ‘good’ that, together with the farm laborer’s
work, made the contract perfect.80
4.2 They all bear responsibility for water
According to Andalusi water customs (urf), all the ‘owners’ of an irrigation ditch or canal
had the obligation to work on it and maintain it, since this was the main resource for
the land that they were farming, and for drinking and drainage, both in land that was
sown and in land that was not. However, the problem arose when an owner did not sow
his country estate and rejected the responsibility that fell upon him regarding the mainte-
nance of the irrigation ditch or canal. In view of their refusal, theMālikī doctrine clariﬁed
that, if the utility of the irrigation ditch only beneﬁted those whose land was sown, the
costs incurred during that period had to be assumed by the people who obtained a yield
from it. Instead, if the ﬂow of the water through an irrigation ditch beneﬁted all those
who had built the ditch through a diversion of the river, the access to water for new users
obliged them to pay a part of the maintenance bill − even though the proportion might
have been different from the one corresponding to the initial owners who had farmed
their piece of land in the past, insofar as they had both a present and a future proﬁt. There
was no reason for those who began production tasks in an intermittent manner to assume
the same costs, since theirs was a future proﬁt and did notmean immediate usage of water.
The reason for this difference lies in the conditioning and vegetation-clearing tasks that
the owners of the irrigation ditch were obliged to carry out, not only for their own beneﬁt
but also to provide surplus water to whoever requested it, based upon need. New farmers
who would use the water for irrigation were not completely exempt because even if they
did not beneﬁt from water use at the present, there was a future expectation because they
might eventually enjoy the use of that water; therefore, they had to assume the cost for
being able to have water at their disposal, accessible at any time.
Consequently, and in keeping with another case presented before experts in Andalusi
law, the responsibility for the maintenance of infrastructure was assumed by the people
directly involved in water use and enjoyment. This situation raised concerns about who
assumed the maintenance costs and how they did so, foreseeing damages in pieces of
infrastructure and general water distribution services. This need wasmet with the concept
of proportional quotas, which became a requirement for users, since it was the only
possible way to cope with any unforeseen events thatmight have occurred over time. Here
is another element that characterizes the water supply system in Andalusi law and that
survived, without interruption, in the Christian legislation that was drawn up shortly after
the conquest: the monetary contribution had to be proportional to the utility brought
about by the water for each person, taking as a reference, pursuant to Andalusi custom,
the amount of water used for the land that each person owned. The delivery of that
contribution was common to all users.
An assumption of monetary responsibility that was in keeping with the fair, equi-
table allocation between the beneﬁciaries, according to criteria of proportion, utility, and
elegance or convenience for everybody’s interests.
Along these same argumentative lines, regarding time and utility, the position of the
Andalusi doctrine stands out, which had its most important representative in this ﬁeld,
theCordovan ↩Ās
˙
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could undertake a claim against non-relatives, and of forty years in the case of relatives,81
in relation to immovable property. The former statute of limitations was considered long.
The passage of time, a fair deed, and peaceful possession were the elements that a judge
had to take into account when the recognition of a right was demanded before the court.82
In fact, according to Andalusi doctrine, the water user had to expose the doubts that
arose in relation to the right to a ﬁxed, speciﬁed time for access to the resource shared by
everyone before the experts in this ﬁeld (muqallid).
Something similar was applied to the people who decided to use the water retained in
a dam or reservoir. The same as for irrigation ditches, ownership corresponded towhoever
had built the infrastructure, generally those who used water for productive purposes. In
the event of a dam breach, an agreement would be reached to rebuild it, with everyone
paying for the reconstruction, with the cost divided and ﬁnanced by the users in propor-
tion to their use. However, if the dam broke in a particular place, the repairs had to be
made by the person affected by the damage; it was only possible to demand the repair by
all co-owners when they all contributed equally to the costs. Nevertheless, once a dam
was repaired, those involved in the use of its water could reach an agreement regarding
the joint assumption of responsibilities in case there was a breach or collapse; in this case,
they took into account each co-owner’s allocated part, which was equivalent to that of the
person negatively affected by the breach in terms of use and enjoyment time. This solution
was seen by the doctrine as the most ‘elegant’ or polite one. A criterion which was also
applied to the collapse or break of an aqueduct, with the cost of the repair based upon
the utility obtained by each of the beneﬁciaries and not according to the estimated value
of the goods damaged or destroyed by the accident; the reconstruction was made at the
expense of everyone, and when reluctance or discrepancies arose, the doctrine supported
resorting to conciliation and reciprocal concessions between the co-owners.83
All of these examples and cases provide evidence of monitoring activities; acts and
actions that required the existence of supervision and surveillance bodies, which were
undertaken by the users themselves. There were always several officials or managers in
charge of ensuring the correct maintenance and state of the water ﬂow for the beneﬁt of
the country estates and their owners on an individual basis. These officers and managers
had to assume speciﬁc functions laid down by Andalusi law.
It is important to note that maintaining ditches and channels that were clean of
undergrowth and rubbish was a responsibility that fell upon the people who used the
ditches and channels; in this sense, al-Mi’yār establishes and deﬁnes the responsibility
corresponding to those individuals who must assume the expenses associated with the
repairs or improvements of the ditches and channels because they use the infrastructure
through which the water ﬂows.84 In this case, the obligation was equally binding on all
users, regardless of the stretch where a break had taken place or that needed to be repaired;
this was regarded as the most elegant solution for every user.
A special category was formed by the owners of irrigation ditches and of the latrines
that were located in the river and beneﬁted from the deviatedwater, respectively. The same
holds true for the people who lived on the riverbanks and beneﬁted from the water ﬂow.
As for the urban context, those who needed water to wash the streets to remove rubbish
and dirt, diverting the torrents and rainwater that reached their houses and that they even
transported so that, once served, they could deviate it again towards the river. Finally, the
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Most signiﬁcantly, part of the doctrine reacted to the numerous consultations, ar-
guing that none of these users – the owners of irrigation ditches, those who owned la-
trines, those living on riverbanks, city dwellers, and irrigators – were obliged to clean
the river or the public watercourses so that water could be maintained and its volume
of ﬂow increased. Each one of the parties could make use of – utilize − this river as
appropriate, no matter the condition that the river was in.85 This approach placed the
responsibility for the maintenance of the watercourse and its volume of ﬂow upon the
competent authority responsible for water management and distribution; nevertheless,
in this case, the authority to which the law referred needed to be speciﬁed, since users
were members of a community – a concept endowed with special signiﬁcance − and they
all jointly complied with their obligations, including water-related matters. The transfer
of such responsibility and the assumption of the main role with regard to cleaning and
conservation corresponded to the community of users to which they all belonged. This
makes one think about how and when infrastructure maintenance was ﬁnanced.
5 Observance of the ‘right to use’ for water and protection
against aquifer contamination and spillage
Another context where the water utility acquires particular relevance is when it comes to
themaintenance of resources and infrastructures at the service points of water; the Islamic
water regime paid special attention to the effective enforcement of the law, with the aim
of guaranteeing the use of infrastructure and devices designed to supply water at any time
and under any circumstances. The right to water equally comprised the actions meant
to protect and safeguard the interests created from the existing water and to optimize
resources.
In this sense, the law deﬁned the actions that had to be undertaken, da´wa (deﬁned
by Maíllo as an “action in justice, claim, report”86), by means of explicit claims (talab87)
related to an object. The report (ablāğ88) is a document that informed the competent
authority for water management about any crimes or misdemeanors committed, and the
‘action in justice’ was the right to appear before a judge or a court to request the protection
of a right or an interest, a competence derived from a subjective right. In view of all these
legal meanings, the term in question exclusively refers to the pretense or claim formulated
during the legal process; however, claims could not refer to water as such, but to the
deprivation of its utilization or the impediments to access to it. It was the right of every
communitymember; water could not be denied to anybody. It was precisely this right that
the law protected, providing the legal means to claim it or request it (idda´a). Therefore,
the actions on which the claim and complaints associated with the misappropriated right
could materialize, including the reduction of the assigned water quota; the deprivation
of water or the refusal to supply it in times of need; and the deviation of the watercourse,
causing damages and a cessation of beneﬁts. In all these cases, the possibility existed to
undertake making a complaint, da´wa.
Furthermore, non-compliance with the obligation both to assign water and to favor
access to it was grounds for demanding responsibility from whoever caused the problem.
In matters of risk, the responsibility fell upon the land worker (al-’amil) who maintained
the infrastructure in perfect condition, among other functions, so the water supply could
not damage the properties of the neighbors. They could also be held responsible for
85 Al-Wansˇarīsī 1983, 8. 13–14.
86 Maíllo Salgado 2005, 65; Corriente 1977, 248.
87 Corriente 1988, 393–394.
88 Corriente 1988, 396.
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the abandonment of the country estate and water supply infrastructure, as not meeting
these obligations would negatively affect the community’s interests. These individuals,
therefore, had to assume the expenses derived from completing the harvest once the
established term had expired.
Whatever actions were initiated in defense of water were based on the interest over
the object subject to protection: water. Once again, the problem focused on the value
of the liquid element or over the necessary enabling mechanisms to beneﬁt from water.
The claim of an undermined or misappropriated right could only refer to a ‘good’ that
could be assessed, that is, something that had an ‘intrinsic value’. It was already explained
above that, by deﬁnition, water could not be subject to sale and purchase; hence, under








’), would not be feasible. To
which must be added that claims that referred to objects with a negligible value − a grain
of wheat, for instance − were also not feasible under Islamic law. Nevertheless, Mālikī law
considered it legitimate to undertake corrective actions when the aim was to defend the
interests of a person with respect to something that belonged to them or to which they
were entitled. Even though no exclusive right could be exercised over it, ‘right to use’ of
water did constitute a fundamental right that was necessary for every individual. Thus, in
this case, Abū ↩Ubayd Ibn Sallām argued that, with regard to water, the protection right
could only be applied to three things: wells, horse reins, and the community’s meeting
place.89 In relation to wells, he speciﬁed that such protection referred in particular to
the area surrounding such a space, to protect the rights of the people who went there to
revitalize an infertile or barren land and, by extension, the pastures for their animals.90
The right to claim what one was due, in water-related matters, was governed by the
principle of equality before the law regardless of the community the claimants belonged
to;91 a fact that affected Muslims and non-Muslims alike when they appeared before the
kadi to claim a right orally. The regular practice was to visit the house of the kadi or
the mosque, which was a practice from the early years of Andalusi law that remained
commonplace amongst the Mudejars in Castile until the 14th century.92 The complaint
had to be made in person or through an intermediary (wakīl or wakīl al-hism) who was
compensated. The law, in this matter, did not distinguish betweenmen and women, both
could claim their rights except for those who were forbidden to appear in public; this
justiﬁed why the action of the latter before the judge was undertaken through a legal
representative.93 TheAndalusi water law referred to different cases where the intermediary





the person responsible for the maintenance of ditches.
After the summons, the failure of any of the defendants to appear – considered absent
or ga’ib − did not prevent the trial from continuing by default, if it had to do with a claim





pointed out that, in the course of the trial, the judge could decide to admit the testimonies
of both believers and non-believers, even though the opinion of a Mālik was different
from that of al-Sˇāﬁ↩ī.95 In al-Andalus, after the conquest, no distinctions were made on
the ‘right of direct actions’ or complaints for the ‘right of use’ of water for Christians, as
occurred in 1320 in Andilla and Cheste in the Kingdom of Valence.96
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According to H
˘
alīl, the judge was obliged to treat all the parties appearing before him
equally, regardless of their beliefs, an opinion that was debated amongst other scholars.97
Unlike what happens in other legal systems, Islamic law does not allow someone to be
forced to appear, since this is a personal and voluntary right, at least amongst the H
˙
anafís;
whereas for theMālikis, individuals were allowed to undertake actions against others with
the objective to force them to expose their motivations or the right that they could use
against the former, by means of what was known as ‘decisive action’ (qatān-niza).98 The
interested parties present had to sit in front of the judge, take the right to speak when it
corresponded to them, and the judge had to listen to them all with the same degree of
attention. Once the facts and the legal foundations applicable to them were known, the
judge dealt with them, maintaining that same impartiality.99
The ﬁrst responsibility that fell upon the judge was to urge the parties to reach an
agreement or a conciliation, irrespective of if the parties were individuals of recognized
prestige or relatives confronting one another; or when a risk existed that the dispute could
last for a long time, thus resulting in enmities or serious conﬂicts; or when it proved
difficult to achieve a fair, equitable solution due to the seriousness or complexity of the
issue.100 The only possible exception to this rule would be the evident damage caused
and the evident right of one of the parties to request an effective legal protection. In
the case at hand, water was the reason for the conﬂicts and disputes, but judging by
the data preserved, only a limited number of the lawsuits resolved at court were not
categorized as an ‘agreement’ or ‘agreement sentence’, thus, denoting the willingness to
carry out mediation.101 Conciliation or mediation, exercised by the officials in charge of
allocating and collecting the contribution destined to sustain the expenses, repairs, and
improvements of infrastructure, was the usual way to settle the conﬂicts that arose over






āiğ.102 In this case, the conciliation should have
tried to ensure that all interests were satisﬁed under the principle of reciprocity.103 The
conﬂicts among irrigators after the Christian conquest were subject to the Tribunal de las
Aguas (Water Tribunal or Tribunal of Waters), the Juntas (water boards), and the Consejo
de Hombres Buenos (Council of Wise Men) and also to the jurisdiction of the community
of irrigators, as described in medieval sources.104 This reminiscence on the traditional
system was based on the explanation of the persistent attitude of the lawbreaker towards
the competent authority.105
Time played a role in favor of or against the defense of water users’ rights as well.
The importance of time for conciliation purposes stemmed from the fact that its proper
use guaranteed proﬁts. The timeframe to present the evidence was subject to the judge’s
own wisdom (iğtihād).106 It was customary for the judge to grant eight days in credit
matters, then six, then four, and ﬁnally three; twenty-one days in all. When it came to
real estate property and inheritance of lands beneﬁted by water, the period was ﬁfteen
days, then eight, then four, and ﬁnally three; thirty days altogether.107 The last three
days were granted in accordance with the Koranic precept (Kor. XI, 68), based on what
Salid had transmitted from the Prophet. These terms could be uniﬁed at the judge’s
97 Cfr. Martínez Almira 2014, p.682.
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discretion, provided that the maximum timeframe always resulted from adding up the
partial timeframes or periods. In this matter, the question was, how much time it would
be possible to grant without prejudicing the right of the water users and consumers.108 It
was the reason, for instance, judges granted the witnesses that were too far away a period
of up to three months, consistent with the Sunnah.109
Many water issues were resolved in a satisfactory manner among the peasants at the
“foot of the garden or ditch”,110 as it happens nowadays; nevertheless, the surveillance and
presence of the owners and the water marshals111 was a guarantee for the beneﬁciaries.
The actions brought before the kadi were only those that occurred in persistent situations
or in case of intentional and evident damage. The kadi, on the other hand, could be an
expert in these matters. In the case of Yah
˙
ya b. Ma’amar, who according to al-Jusˇanī had
his own garden being watered with water that he extracted with a crankshaft. ↩Abd al-
Rah
˙
man II was informed of al-Jusˇanī’s experience and appointed him to a kadi, for “his
virtues and scrupulous conduct”,112 according to the sovereign. It is not surprising that the
expert administrators of justice in matters of water arose from the sphere in which they
carried out their activity, in this context, as was the case with respect to the Cordovan kadi.
It is also a fact that guaranteed one of the basic principles in the Andalusi justice system:
the prompt processing of conﬂict resolution. In fact, the diligence in ﬁnding a resolution
was not only advisable but also worthwhile for those who were interested in reaching an
agreement; it helped avoid the prolongation of harmful situations that limited or impeded
people’s access to water and avoid the risk of spills or other substances that would make
the water undrinkable, as well as situations that resulted in ﬂooded and damaged crops
or properties of any kind.
6 Conclusion and ﬁnal reﬂection
This analysis about the ‘right of use’ for water, the water regime approaches that existed
in al-Andalus, and the guarantees regarding the management and administration, as well
the defense of interests, comes to an end at this point, with the intention of generating
curiosity to explore many other aspects that may help us understand legal evolution over
time.113 The adaptation and modelling of the traditional irrigation system, taking into
account demands other than those imposed by the environment and the climate on the
river, plants, soil, and surrounding basins can only be understood based upon a strong
knowledge of the system that underpinned this productive model that was developed to
a greater or lesser extent in the 8th century.
This paper aims to be a connecting link in the knowledge chain provided by aca-
demics, researchers, irrigators, and user communities that should be preserved and taken
care of as part of the legacy of generations of people over twelve centuries. This water
regime was questioned and contested by Spanish lawyers in the 19th century under the
inﬂuence of legal professionals; it was a period of territorial and structural reforms pro-
moted by lawyers that were concerned with the development of positive law, distrustful
of customary water laws that had reigned under the Spanish system. This is the right
moment to try to understand the background of water usage and management in the
Iberian Peninsula, in order to help conserve rural and peri-urban irrigated environments.
108 Bruhnes 1902, 393.
109 Barceló 1989, 48–49.
110 Local saying in the Vega Baja of Segura River.
111 Water marshals are agents or judges, local officers, in charge of water. Administratively, they are between
the Kadi and the community of users, and they are usually a member of the community of irrigators.
112 Al-Joxani 2005, 87, 107.
113 Zambrano Moral 2011, 37. 597–650.
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Scholars in many different forums at the international level insist on undertaking
speciﬁc actions focused on a permanent, universal, and intergenerational education on
the use of water; an educational model that takes into consideration the historical and
legal memory. In this case, it has become impossible to comprehend how the politicians
cannot understand the future of an integrated approach to water resources management
by looking at the water regime in force over centuries in territories irrigated by rivers
under variable weather conditions. It is time to give the ﬂoor to the people who learned
through the generations that it is possible to share water even when it is scarce, that it is
possible to use water supplies facilitating access through waterworks in good conditions,
and that it is possible to reach agreements that take into account the present needs without
putting the future at risk. There are plenty of possibilities for action in a community that
is aware of the beneﬁts of solidarity. 114
114 Dagnino Pastore et al. 2010, 33.
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